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RUMSFELD PERSONAL FILE

No circulation

I talked to Bill Highland on the phone on Friday, 8/17/73. I called Sonnenfeldt, but he wasn't there, and Highland took the call.

I asked him about Atlantic Relations and indicated that we had not received the draft declaration. He expressed great surprise because he indicated that it had been sent to me by pouch a week or a week and a half before. He asked me if I wanted him to cable me a copy, and I said, "Why wasn't it cabled in the first place?" He said because at the time they sent it out, it was undesirable to have that many people see it, that would be involved in cable traffic, and he wanted it "Eyes Only" to me and the several other people from the NATO countries, US Ambassadors to have it only. I allowed as how at this point in the game everybody in Western Europe seems to have it, certainly everyone in the NATO international operation here has it because the other fourteen countries were given it and they have moved it around in their bureaucracies, and their bureaucracies have moved it to their Missions to NATO naturally since that is where the subject is being discussed. I explained to him that Luns, when he got back into town would be pressing on it, but I told him not to send it by cable because I didn't want the fact that I didn't have it to be the reason that the desired security level was breached. But if it didn't arrive by Monday I would send notice in to see if we could get it through the front channel.

I then asked him if everything was roughly the same as it was. He went on to explain the following. He said that the draft (US draft) declaration had been given to one country that had been pressing hard for it, and that it was not intended that it would be moved to others, but not only did it not have the desired effect on the one country it was given to, but it was in fact moved around to others. Then the Nine advised Henry that bilaterals were over, that is to say that if he met bilaterally with anybody in the Nine, that the Nine would immediately report to everyone else in the Nine within twenty-four hours, and that bilateral was on neutral until, I believe he said, the Nine Ministerial Meeting in Copenhagen. That is what blew his mind and he was concerned with being presented with a paper from the Nine that was on a take it or leave it basis and didn't like the way things were going, which is why they sent me the message they sent me. My instructions still hold that Henry wants to do it bilaterally and that my position in NATO should be to not discuss it as the instruction said.



I indicated that that was fine, but in September the Council was going to proceed in following the Ministerial guidance from Copenhagen, which, of course, had upset Kissinger tremendously, and that silence would not prevent it. If they wanted to deal with that problem, they would have to figure out some different instructions, in my judgment. I also pointed out to him the point McAuliffe had made to me, namely that as we go along the Germans and the Brits, and the smaller countries even, are not going to want to have the onus for failing to respond to the US call for a dialogue to fall on them. To avoid it falling on them, given the possibility that they are unable to move the French, my guess is they are likely to try to move the dialogue into a multilateral organization, namely NATO, so that the burden is spread, and it is clear that not only they were unable to move the French, but so too the US was unable to move the French. Highland seemed to understand this point that institutional pressures, since they have already engaged the issues, coupled with Luns' desire to have a role in this, and his sincere desire to be supportive, and third, the desire of other countries to avoid having the blame for the failure fall on them individually, all will tend to push the matter toward NATO in September. He understood it, but he didn't seem to have an answer.

